Rules and Specifics
That settles the raw arithmetic: rules, not a blueprint. But it leaves the harder question this chapter has been circling from the start. If the genome can specify a brain only through general rules, and if even those rules haven't been deciphered in the one case simple enough to study completely, how does anything as specific as an instinct, a particular compass heading, a particular one-time routine for throwing a rival out of the nest, get built by the same process?
Set it against the cases from Chapter 14 and it stops being abstract. The blackcap's compass heading is specific content: when birds from populations with different headings are crossbred, their chicks set off at an angle in between. The cuckoo chick's nest-clearing routine has to be complete and correct the first and only time, with no chance to refine it. The star compass, by contrast, needs no specific content at all, just a general procedure that finds the sky's turning point afresh in each bird. Three cases, and they aren't at the same level of specificity. "Rules, not a blueprint" is the right answer for a brain's overall layout. Whether it's still enough once the content gets this particular is a different question, and not an obviously settled one.
One way out would be to suppose that brains are built on two levels: a broad, rule-based level laying down the general layout, and a second, finer level able to write specific content where an inherited heading or a fixed routine is needed. It's a neat idea. It would also bring its own problems, since that second system would need explaining in turn, and would face its own version of the same storage and construction difficulties. And there's no evidence that anything like it exists. It would be a hypothesis invented to fill a gap, not a finding.
That said, not knowing how something works isn't proof that it can't. Brains plainly are capable of specific, reliable outcomes elsewhere. The capacity to learn a language is inherited and present in the same general form in every normally developing human brain. Whole regions are reliably given over to the same jobs, in the same places, across every member of a species. If the brain can be precise about those things, there's no principled reason it couldn't be precise about a compass heading or a fixed routine, whatever the mechanism turns out to be. This book doesn't rest its case on the mechanism being impossible. It rests on something else.
Last revised 2026-11-18